After ~30 min of detect-only on whp01 we have actionable data on what
fires against legitimate customer traffic vs. attacker recon. Two rules
demonstrably catch only the latter and earn promotion to the day-one
enforce list:
920440 — URL file extension restricted by policy
Caught 124 events in the sample window, ALL backup/config-file
disclosure probes (`/wp-config.php.old`, `/db_backup.sql`,
`/.env.save`, `/releases.sql` ...) from a single GCP-hosted scanner
hammering joshuaknapp.net. Match patterns: .sql (×62), .bak (×5),
.old (×3), .save (×2), .backup, .dist. No legitimate URL on
WP/WooCommerce/Divi/HPR ends in these.
930130 — Restricted File Access Attempt
Caught 117 events, ALL dotfile/VCS/config-disclosure probes
(`/.env`, `/.env.local`, `/.env.bak`, `/.git/config`, `/config.php`,
`/admin/.env`, `/backend/.env` ...). Spread across joshuaknapp.net,
cgdannyb.com, onlinesupplements.net. Notably, HPR's
`/ccdn.php?filename=/eps/...` legitimate audio-delivery URL does NOT
trigger this rule — verified empirically.
Also documented in the "intentionally detect-only" comment block: 933150
fires on WooCommerce checkout when literal `session_start` appears in
billing form data (alphaoneaminos.com saw 2 such events). That's a
canonical CRS false positive on WooCommerce; left detect-only.
Net effect: existing detect_only deployments stay detect-only (the WHP
apply script bind-mounts an empty overrides over the baked-in file).
When operators next flip a server to enforce, these two extra ranges
activate alongside the original day-one list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
coraza-spoa sidecar
A sidecar container that runs Coraza-SPOA as a WAF engine for haproxy-manager. HAProxy consults it per-request via the SPOE/SPOP protocol; Coraza evaluates the request against OWASP CRS rules and tells HAProxy whether to allow or block.
Design constraints
haproxy-managerdoes NOT depend on this sidecar. The base image works standalone (used in other projects and home networks) without WAF. SPOE config in the generatedhaproxy.cfgis opt-in via an env var onhaproxy-manager.- Fail-open when the sidecar is unhealthy.
option set-on-error continuein the HAProxy SPOE config means request flow continues uninspected if coraza-spoa is unreachable, rather than 503-ing customer traffic. - Detect-only globally; enforce explicitly. See
overrides.conffor the day-one enforce list. Most CRS rules log without blocking until we've tuned per-customer false positives.
Deployment shape
Two containers per host, both on the client-net docker network:
haproxy-manager (existing) — ports 80, 443, 8000
│ SPOE TCP/9000 → reach coraza-spoa by container DNS
▼
coraza-spoa (this image)
port 9000 (SPOE) — NOT exposed on host; internal network only
/var/log/coraza — bind-mounted to host for AI Monitor consumption
Typical docker run:
mkdir -p /var/log/coraza
chown 65532:65532 /var/log/coraza # distroless nonroot UID
docker run -d \
--name coraza-spoa \
--network client-net \
--restart unless-stopped \
-v /var/log/coraza:/var/log/coraza \
repo.anhonesthost.net/cloud-hosting-platform/coraza-spoa:latest
Then on the haproxy-manager container, add the env var:
-e HAPROXY_CORAZA_SPOE_BACKEND=coraza-spoa:9000
The haproxy-manager template engine sees the env var and renders the SPOE config block pointing at this sidecar. Without the env var, no SPOE blocks render — the haproxy-manager image's behavior is unchanged.
Files
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
Dockerfile |
Multi-stage build (golang:1.25 → distroless), pinned to upstream coraza-spoa tag |
config.yaml |
SPOA listener config + one named application haproxy |
overrides.conf |
Day-one enforce list (ctl:ruleEngine=On for high-confidence rule IDs) |
README.md |
This file |
Audit log
/var/log/coraza/audit.log — JSON, one event per line, RelevantOnly (only requests that triggered ≥1 rule are logged). AI Monitor should be configured to tail this on each host.
Entries include rule IDs, matched patterns, request metadata, and action taken (log for detect-only, deny for enforced). Use the JSON action field to filter blocked vs. observed.
Upgrading the pin
CRS rules are bundled into the coraza-spoa binary at build time, so the CRS version is whatever ships with the pinned coraza-spoa tag. To upgrade:
- Check upstream releases: https://github.com/corazawaf/coraza-spoa/releases
- Skim the CHANGELOG for new/changed rules in the
overrides.confID ranges. - Bump
ARG CORAZA_SPOA_VERSIONin the Dockerfile. - Push to
main— the Gitea workflow at.gitea/workflows/build-push-coraza.yamlrebuilds + pushes:latest. - On each host, run
container-manager.sh recreate coraza-spoato pull the new image.
Tuning false positives
When a legitimate request triggers a blocked rule, the audit log shows the rule ID. Two ways to silence it:
- Per-rule exception in
overrides.conf:SecRuleRemoveById <id>(full disable) orSecRuleRemoveTargetById <id> "<target>"(targeted exception). - Drop from the enforce list: remove the rule's ID range from the
ctl:ruleEngine=Onoverrides; it falls back to detect-only.
After tuning, push the change — CI rebuilds, then recreate coraza-spoa on each host to apply.